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TERM LIMITS AND ELECTORAL COMPETITIVENESS:
C ALIFORNIA’S STATE LEGISLATIVE RACES
John R. Lott, Jr. and Kermit Daniel*
ABSTRACT
California’s legislative term limits have dramatically reduced
campaign expenditures. Real expenditures during the three general
elections after the term limits initiative passed in 1990 were lower
than in even 1976. This drop has occurred at the same time that
races have become closer contests and more candidates are running
for office. By any measure, term limits have coincided with large
changes in the level of political competition, even before term limits
have forcibly removed a single politician from office. The changes
are so large that more incumbents are being defeated, races are closer,
more candidates are running, and fewer single candidate races than
occur at any other time during our sample period from 1976 to 1994.
I. INTRODUCTION
Term limits are not just binding during a politician’s last year in a
particular office. They also change the returns to political behavior
during all earlier periods in a politician’s career. Shorter terms seem
likely to reduce the returns to campaign spending. Lower expenditures will undoubtedly affect other variables, such as a politician’s
stock of reputation, which has further implications for entry barriers.
Making the date that incumbents leave office more certain encourages the entry by challengers even before the seat becomes vacant, if
only to be better positioned once the incumbent does leave. Incumbents may also more frequently be pitted against politicians who
*
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hold other offices but who do not want to wait for the incumbents
to retire, as these challengers may be facing the end of their terms.
Reducing the importance of seniority may also lower the returns to
running for reelection. Term limits may thus make elections more
competitive even before politicians find them binding.
Economists have used historical continuation rates to predict the
effect term limits will have on the composition of Congress (e.g.,
Reed and Schansberg, 1994 and 1995).1 In particular, this work has
asked how limits would affect expected tenure, and whether the
limits would benefit Republicans or Democrats. While it is a reasonable first approximation to assume that past continuation rates will
continue to apply during the years in which term limits are not
binding, this paper points out that some of the more obvious predictions may have to be tempered. For example, though there is little
doubt that term limits would produce large “superclasses” of
freshman in legislatures, current estimates will be shown to overestimate their size. Reed and Schansberg (1995, p. 710) predict that a
six year congressional term limit will produce a “superclass” of 309
freshman (71 percent), almost three time greater than the highest
congressional turnover rate during the last 44 years. Yet, to the extent that term limits make incumbents more vulnerable prior to
when the term limits become binding, the smaller will be this initial
“superclass” and the faster we will see legislative retirements converging towards their long term steady-state.
Other issues, such as how effectively legislatures operate, may
turn on the answers to these preceding questions. For example,
Garrett (1996, p. 60) points out that, “The certain prospect of large
freshman classes at regular intervals would challenge the seniority
system; indeed, supporters of term limits probably intend for the
adoption of federal term limits to eviscerate the seniority system. . . .”
Even if freshman classes do dominate for a while, it is not obvious
whether this will be a long term pattern. If not, the returns to seniority may increase in the future, albeit, even then in a much more
limited form to what we currently observe. The main issue is
whether term limits reduce tenure, and thus legislative experience, by
more than the direct limit imposed.
1

See also Reed and Schansberg (1992).
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Despite the Supreme Court decision in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, that state imposed limits are unconstitutional, the debate
seems very much alive. Term limit supporters are threatening more
congressional votes on a constitutional amendment, and if that fails,
they promise to force the issue by using the states to call for a
constitutional convention. Twenty one states now also have term
limits for state legislators.2 Unfortunately, only very limited evidence
currently exists on whether term limits will enhance electoral
competition (Lott, 1995). While state legislative term limits only
started being passed in 1990, with initiatives in California and
Oklahoma, no legislators will be forced from office until this year;
nevertheless reductions in the value of holding office should already
be influencing the behavior of legislators and their opponents. This
paper analyzes California state assembly and senate races between
1976 and 1994 to examine the effect of term limits on four areas:
campaign expenditures, the closeness of races, the number of candidates running for office, and whether candidates run unopposed.
II. THE THEORY
A. Limited Property Rights, Entry Barriers, and the Timing of When
to Run for Office
The value of a political office depends upon what can be
achieved by controlling it and how long lived the property rights to
it are. This rent seeking view of political competition holds that offices with longer terms are more valuable, and more time and money
will be spent to obtain them. Crain and Tollison (1977) provide
some suggestive cross-sectional evidence that campaign expenditures
are greater for gubernatorial elections to serve four year terms than
two year terms, though their results imply that two 2-year terms
produce greater total expenditures than one four year term. More
recent evidence using state level time-series cross-sectional data from
gubernatorial and state house and senate races confirms their earlier
findings (Lott, 1995).
2

The states are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Maine, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming.
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One possible explanation for why two 2-year terms are more
valuable than one 4-year term is that there are diminishing returns
to creating transfers, and that when a politician is elected the transfers with the greatest marginal return are made first. The second 2year term would thus not be worth as much as the first 2-year term,
and the return to getting one’s favorite politician into office for four
years is not worth twice as much as getting one in there for two
years. Two consecutive two-year terms are worth more because the
group that values producing transfers the most during each period
has an opportunity to win office.3 By tending to produce highest
valued transfers, two two-year terms should increase the return to,
and thus the level of, campaign expenditures. Jung, et al. (1994) provide evidence supporting a similar explanation for why voters do not
elect identically voting senators from the same state. Their explanation focuses on how obtaining wealth transfers reduces successful
constituencies’ returns to obtaining additional transfers through
electing another senator to represent them.
The discussion of term limits is slightly more complicated than
simply increasing the length of a term, since there is some chance of
being defeated between terms. If the probability that a candidate
wins the first election is independent of the probability that he will
win the second election, campaign expenditures should not depend
upon the presence of term limits. Alternatively, if the preceding notion of diminishing marginal returns to creating transfers were the
entire story, the probability of winning the first and second elections
would even be negatively correlated. Yet, the investments made in
political reputations during the first race do positively effect the
probability of winning later elections. It is also important to note
that political reputations are nontransferable to the extent that it is a
politician’s preferences which guarantee his performance (Lott,
3 To make this point clearer, suppose that there are two well defined
groups of constituents: A and B. Group A values winning the office more
during the first two years than B does. But conditional on winning the office
the first two years, group A does not value winning the second two year term
as much as group B values winning its first two year term. If there are two
consecutive two-year terms, group A will then win the first election and group
B will win the second. The interest groups will be willing to spend more
money with two two-year terms than with one four year term simply because
more total value is being produced for groups A and B.
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1987b). Term limits then effectively act as a tax on campaign expenditures because the politician’s specific investments would be lost
when the term limit becomes binding, and they will discourage rent
seeking from taking the form of campaign expenditures. Obviously,
politicians can still run for other offices and thus preserve at least
some of this investment, though there is undoubtedly a higher probability of being defeated when switching offices as the constituents
and issues faced in different offices are not always identical.
Though they make a different argument, Crain and Tollison
also found some weak evidence that restricting the number of successive terms a governor could hold office reduces campaign
expenditures (see also Besley and Case, 1995b, p. 793). However,
Crain and Tollison’s (1977) cross-sectional study was limited by not
controlling for other factors which could affect the level of campaign expenditures. More recent evidence using state level time-series
cross-sectional confirms both the effect of term limits and term
lengths on expenditures (Lott, 1995).
While California’s term limits do not actually remove politicians
from office until 1996, it should have begun to impact the returns to
campaign expenditures when it passed in 1990, or possibly even before to the extent that they were anticipated. Proposition 140,
limiting members of the California Assembly to three 2-year terms
and State Senators to two 4-year terms passed by a relatively close 52
to 48 percent vote in the November 1990 general election. The
uncertainty over whether the initiative would pass and, to a lesser
extent, questions over whether the California Supreme Court would
find it constitutional should have limited the impact of the initiative
on the 1990 election.
If term limits do reduce campaign expenditures, the effects are
not limited to just a particular term. Past investments in a candidate’s
reputation lower his costs of raising future campaign funds and
reduce the return to campaign spending. Past reputations also make
it harder for opponents to mount successful challenges. This last
point involves the issue of entry barriers in political markets: to the
extent that political reputations are nontransferable, past investments
in reputation can produce differential costs of production between
challengers and incumbents in producing political support. For U.S.
Congressional races, previous studies (Lott, 1987b and 1989) indicate
that a politician’s past campaign expenditures raise his current
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campaign expenditures and lower his opponent’s expenditures.4 In
the short run, reductions in campaign expenditures will favor
incumbents who have acquired a stock of reputation. The larger is
an incumbent’s preexisting reputational stock, the greater the relative
advantage produced by the incumbent from similar reductions in
current expenditures by both incumbents and challengers.5 If these
effects continue over time as term limits eliminate incumbents with
larger pre-1990 campaign expenditures (and thus a larger stock of
political reputation), the difference between the incumbent’s and the
challenger’s reputational investments should decline. thus, we should
observe future races becoming more competitive.
The effect of term limits should also vary across incumbents
based upon when they entered office. A reduction in a politician’s
reputational stock from lower current expenditures is likely to be
greatest for political newcomers. Politicians entering prior to 1990
should be relatively less vulnerable to any effect term limits have.
Term limits also obviously change the timing of a candidate’s decision to run for office. An ambitious politician can challenge an
incumbent, though that is obviously a relatively risky strategy.
However, just as incumbents can acquire reputational investments
from past campaign expenditures, so too can challengers. Prior to
term limits challengers might ideally have wanted to run for office
against an incumbent despite near-certain defeat to position themselves should the incumbent choose to retire. In the past, the
difficulty with this was that the incumbent may have chosen to
remain in office longer than anticipated by the challenger, and any
reputational investments made by the challenger would thus depreciate before the incumbent eventually does leave office. While
politicians do sometimes announce when a particular election will be
their last (e.g., Lott, 1987a), it is relatively unusual. Making the date
that incumbents must leave office by more certain (through term
limits), may encourage challengers to enter into races before the seat
actually becomes vacant.
4

For some historical evidence on these questions see Coates and Dalton
(1992) and Yen, et. al. (1992).
5 Incumbents with large reputations however may experience larger
(absolute or percentage) reductions in current campaign expenditures simply
because the marginal returns to them making expenditures will be lower.
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A politician’s returns to campaign expenditures systematically
change over the course of the politician’s tenure, though short term
limits will compress these changes. If politicians leave public life after
reaching the term limit and if campaign expenditures do not
depreciate instantly, incumbents will have a relatively lower return to
investing in campaigns near the ends of their terms since they will
have fewer terms over which to recoup any investment. If term limited politicians run for other offices, the scenario becomes more
complicated as campaign spending will be useful for future
campaigns. However, there is still one difference limiting the returns
to earlier campaign spending for the politician planning to run for
another office: the constituency for the possible future office will be
different. Thus term limits should definitely reduce the return to
campaign expenditures.
Although not yet extremely relevant for the time period that we
study, there is still another reason to suspect that term limits will
increase electoral competition. A politician facing term limits may
no longer be able to wait until the incumbent for the next office
that he plans on moving to leaves. Experienced politicians “kicked
out” by term limits thus will challenge and occasionally defeat other
incumbents sooner than those incumbents would have been removed through term limits. This problem is further compounded
since the terms for California’s Assembly and Senate seats do not
match up particularly well. For example, a member of the Assembly
may not have to leave until 1996, but if the Senate seat he desires is
only open in 1994 and 1998, he may feel compelled to run in 1994
and thus vacate his office early.6
6 While no direct link was drawn to term limits, Alexander (1995) writes that:

“In 1994, California politicians engaged in a massive game of ‘musical
chairs;’ several constitutional officers either retired or ran for other
statewide offices, resulting in many ‘open’ statewide seats with no
incumbent running. 27 legislators chose not to seek re-election to the
same office, many opting instead for statewide bids, while some chose
to run for other elective offices. This turnover resulted in 22 ‘open’
Assembly seats and four open Senate seats, where no incumbent was
running. One of the goals of term limits was to return seasoned
politicians to the private sector. However, of the 27 legislators who did
not seek re-election, only five retired from public office. The other 22
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One serious caveat should be mentioned. Removing long serving
politicians is not necessarily the same thing as increasing “efficiency.”
Tenure can also be related to higher reelection rates simply because
those politicians who differ from their constituents’ interests are
most likely to have been defeated already. Sorting by voters of their
desired representatives could produce similar results to entry barriers
with respect to either tenure or past campaign expenditures. The
explanation for tenure is obvious. The longer incumbents survive the
closer they may be to their constituents’ values and the lower the
probability that a challenger would be preferred. Incumbents who do
deviate from their constituents may thus be sorted out of office
quickly, and while no evidence yet exists for state level offices, recent
studies for both the U.S. Senate (Lott and Davis, 1992) and the
U.S. House of Representatives (Lott and Bronars, 1993) indicate
that this sorting does occur extremely quickly. Likewise, the higher
an incumbent’s past campaign expenditures, the lower might be his
costs of raising future expenditures simply because constituents are
better matched with the preferred candidate and face a greater loss if
represented by somebody else.7
Term limits can also weaken the effectiveness of electoral sorting. If running for office requires a large initial sunk investment,
politicians who more closely match the positions of their voters are
more likely to run because they face a longer expected horizon over
which to recoup this investment. In the extreme, it may only pay for
those politicians whose views perfectly match their constituents to
run in the first place (Lott and Reed, 1989). Yet, even though politicians can run for other offices after they reach their term limits, as
long as politicians are not able to transfer all of their investment
ran for other elective positions, often against other incumbents,
resulting in even more costly and bitter contests.”
Alexander’s discussion implies that this was an unusually high level of
“musical chairs,” though it would be useful to document how this has changed
over time.
7 However, this last point on campaign expenditures is particularly
difficult to separate from an entry barrier type story since matching a politician
to a particular donor undoubtedly represents at least to some extent a
nontransferable investment. Donors make contributions to the particular
candidate because they become convinced that he strongly holds certain
intrinsic preferences, preferences that are nontransferable.
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between elected offices (e.g., the offices encompass different districts) or as long as they face a higher probability of being defeated
whenever they switch offices, term limits will weaken those forces
which discourage “mismatched” politicians from running for office.
The bottom line for this discussion is that term limits will reduce
campaign expenditures, but the effect that reduction has on how
competitive races will be is, at least in the short run, somewhat more
ambiguous. In the short run the effects can go either way with the
entry barrier story possibly making races less competitive if incumbents have large stocks of reputation. In the longer run, even the
entry barrier story tends to work towards increasing electoral
competition.
B. Other Factors that Determine the Level of Campaign Expenditures
and Political Competition
Other papers have suggested factors that explain the levels of
campaign contributions/expenditures. For example, Snyder (1990
and 1992) has dealt with how past investments in reputation influence future contributions and how these actions vary over a
politician’s life cycle. Lott (1987b and 1989) has asked the same
questions regarding expenditures. While Snyder finds that contributions decline with age and Lott shows that higher past expenditures
by an incumbent reduces his opponent’s expenditures and both look
at the effect of tenure, no implications were drawn for how total
campaign expenditures have been changing over time.
Following this literature, we assume that campaign expenditures
are a function how close elections are expected, and the characteristics of the incumbent which involves both questions of sorting and
entry barriers. This paper attempts to control for the expected closeness by measuring the closeness of the incumbent’s past elections,
whether the election is contested, and whether an incumbent is
running for reelection. Issues of entry barriers and sorting are measured by including variables for tenure and the incumbent’s past
campaign expenditures, though these past campaign expenditures
will not be used in all the regressions because this reduces our sample
size by about 20 percent.
Campaign finance rules also changed during the period. In June
1988, Californians passed Proposition 73 which imposed Federal
style campaign donation restrictions on candidates for state office (a
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$1,000 limit on individual contributions to candidates for state
office, a $2,500 limit on contributions from political action
committees, and a $5,000 limit on contributions by political parties).
The rules went into effect on January 1, 1989, but were over turned
by a U.S. District Court decision in September 1990 and were thus
in effect for only part of one election cycle (Rabin, 1988, part 2, p. 4
and Stansky, 1992, p. 1). To control for this all the specifications
include a dummy variable that equals one for the 1990 election. To
the extent that these rules make it more costly to raise donations,
campaign expenditures will be reduced. One problem with interpreting any result with this dummy variable is that term limits also
passed in 1990 and will also have the same effect campaign expenditures. However, term limits and campaign donation limits are
likely to have the opposite effects on making campaigns competitive.
Most work by economists and political scientists argue that
campaign donation limits raise the costs of challengers running for
office relative to that for incumbents.
Redistricting, which occurred during both 1982 and 1992, results in established candidates facing new constituents and
sometimes results in forcing incumbents to run against each other.
Presumably, to the extent that the normal advantages of
incumbency are weakened by incumbents facing new constituents, it
will encourage new and possibly stronger than normal candidates to
run for office. Any differences in state senate verse state assembly
races and whether the race is a general or primary election must also
be controlled for. Not only do the two bodies have different numbers of seats and different constitutional responsibilities (in other
words, there are different values to holding a seat in the different
chambers), but their terms are of different lengths. In addition, just
as altruism may be important in explaining why people vote, it may
also explain the level of campaign donations. Presumably, higher
campaign contributions include the possibility that giving to campaigns is like giving to charitable organizations in that it increases
with income (e.g., Roberts, 1984). However, the existing evidence
linking campaign contributions and income is inconsistent across
studies (Snyder, 1992; Lott, 1987b and 1995).
Finally, we recognize the possibility of technological change.
Over the time studied, innovations include computers, polling, and
mass mailings. While the paper does not include specific variables
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that reflect such changes since neither measures of how much district level campaigns spent on different portions of their campaigns
nor indexes of these costs are available, it is hoped that the district
dummies and either a time trend or year dummies will proxy for
these changes. If changes in campaign techniques are disseminated
and adopted quickly across districts, the year dummies should pick up
any effects that may exist. We are less concerned about identifying
what changes in campaign technology may have affected campaign
expenditures than we are about making sure that term limits not
accidentally proxying for some left out effects. A separate dummy
variable that only equals one in 1982 and 1992 is used to help us pick
up any increased competition resulting from redistricting.
III. DATA
Our data set consists of all the California State Assembly and
Senate general and primary elections involving Democrats and/or
Republicans that occurred between 1976 and 1994. Unfortunately,
time limitations prevented us from including data from the 1994
primary elections, and the California Fair Political Practices Commission no longer had records for expenditures during the 1978
general elections. Each general and primary election represents a
separate observation. Thus most offices involve 3 observations during
each election cycle (one general election and two primary elections,
one Republican and one Democrat). Tenure was calculated only
from the 1974. The variables and sources are listed in Table 1.
IV. THE RESULTS
A. Campaign Expenditures
The year 1996 is shaping up as an important one for campaign
finance reform in California. One or possibly two ballot initiatives
are scheduled to appear on the November ballot that propose to
dramatically limit campaign expenditures for legislative and statewide
offices (Sacramento Bee News Service, February 28, 1996). When
California first passed initiatives limiting campaign spending in
1988, State Assembly and Senate general election races averaged
costing $345,218 in real 1982 dollars and had reached their peak in
real terms. As the following regressions show, the irony of these
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new campaign finance initiatives is that term limits have already
greatly reduced campaign expenditures in California. By 1992 and
1994, the first two full election campaigns to take place after term
limits had passed, State Assembly and Senate general election races
had fallen to $232,805 in real 1982 dollars. Real campaign expenditures for the three general elections from 1984 to 1988 averaged
$309,144, or 44 percent higher than the $215,019 spent on the
three general elections that took place after the term limits initiative
passed.
To systematically test the effect of term limits on campaign expenditures, a dummy variable is added to all our regressions that
equals one for the 1992 and 1994 election cycles. The simple
specifications in Table 2 attempt to explain the total level of a district’s campaign expenditures in the general and primary elections. It
includes exogenous variables on the expected closeness of the race:
whether there is an incumbent in the race, lagged margins by which
the incumbent has won the district in either the primary or general
election, whether the incumbent is unopposed, the incumbent’s
tenure, and whether redistricting has occurred. Other exogenous
variables are: per capita state income, dummy variables to distinguish
general from primary elections and whether it is an Assembly or
Senate race, a time trend, and a dummy variable for 1990. Total
campaign expenditures includes expenditures by all candidates in either the general or primary elections. There are two sets of specifications. One that distinguishes whether the endogenous variable for
total expenditures is in natural logs or not and another breakdown by
whether the squared values of lagged vote margin and tenure are
used. We have no strong beliefs about whether these variables enter
in linearly in the specifications so it is best to report both sets of results.
One very strong conclusion can readily be drawn from Table 2:
there was a definite break in the growth of campaign expenditures
that probably started in 1990, but had definitely occurred by 1992
and 1994. The most surprising finding is how extremely large the
effect is. The results imply that the 1992 and 1994 drop in campaign
expenditure offset between 7.5 (specification 1) and 9.4 cycles,
specifications 3 and 4 imply a reduction in expenditures that puts us
just back before the very beginning of our sample. If fact, real
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general election expenditures in 1976 were $245,613, about $30,000
more than the 1992-94 average.
With the exception of specification 1, the economic importance
of the 1992-94 dummy is larger than the dummy for 1990. Again, as
noted earlier, the 1990 year dummy is somewhat difficult to interpret
because the term limit initiative was not passed until November 1990
and, also, because the 1990 election cycle was the only time that
campaign donations were limited by law. The coefficient for 1990 is
very similar in size to the drops in spending implied by the term limit
dummy.. However, it is difficult to know what if any of the
reduction in expenditures one can attribute to the temporary change
in campaign finance laws.
Given that the court decision invalidating Proposition 73’s limits
on campaign was delivered in September, 1990 and that the initiative was passed in November, 1990, we tried rerunning the all
regressions presented in this paper with a term limit dummy that
equaled one starting with the 1990 general election. The 1990 year
dummy equaled one only for the primary election. The results remained very similar to those presented here with the exception that
the new 1990 year dummy was never statistically significant. These
results indicate that the campaign donation limits were not the
driving force behind any drops in campaign expenditures during
1990.
Overall the results are consistent with what the theory predicts,
though the coefficients are not always significant. The greater the
incumbent’s victory margin in past elections, the less that is spent in
the current election (though there are diminishing returns to that
effect). As expected more money is spent in State Senate races and
in general elections. Less money is spent by incumbents, and less is
spent when there is only one candidate in a race. The most surprising results are that redistricting either has no significant effect or a
negative and significant effect on campaign expenditures, tenure is
not significantly related to expenditures, and that per capita income
is never both positively and significantly related to campaign expenditures. It would be interesting to see whether this last effect
continues even when constituency income by district is also
controlled for.
Table 3 puts the effect of term limits in equally sharp contrast.
In this table, we use yearly dummy variables instead of a time trend
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to control for other factors that might account for changing campaign expenditures over time. All the other variables that were
controlled for in Table 2 are again controlled for here though they
are not reported since the results are extremely similar to those
already reported. While many of the year dummies are significant,
only the term limit dummy is negative and significant. All the term
limit dummies imply economically large drops in campaign expenditures of over $100,000.
Finally, while we have attempted to control for the incumbent’s
stock of brand name capital through such things as tenure, this is a
relatively imperfect measure. Table 4 attempts to control this stock
by using the depreciated stock of past campaign expenditures over
the two preceding election cycles. This variable is controlled for
separately because including it reduces our sample size by over 300
observations. While Table 4 only reports the results using a 20 percent annual depreciation rate, we also ran regressions with
depreciation rates of 10, 30, and 40 percent, but the results were all
very similar to those shown in Table 2. The regressions show that
the larger the incumbent’s depreciated stock of campaign spending
the greater current total campaign spending. Specifications 3 and 4
imply that a one dollar increase in this depreciated stock of past expenditures raises that total current spending by about 12 cents.
B. The Probability that an Incumbent will be Defeated
While term limits are expected to make incumbents more vulnerable in the long run, the short term effects are more ambiguous.
For example, while challengers may be induced to run before the
term limits become binding simply to be well positioned for when
the incumbent leaves, initial entry barriers are likely to be even
greater than usual because current campaign expenditures are reduced
without reducing the large stock of reputations incumbents have
acquired. Which effects dominate in the short run can only be
answered empirically. Table 5 attempts to answer that question by
running a dummy variable for whether an incumbent was defeated
on the variables used in Table 2 (with the exceptions of the dummy
for unopposed incumbents and the state income variable). The logit
regressions are restricted to only those observations where an
incumbent is running for reelection and the specifications use both
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the time trend and the individual year dummy variables to explain
the changes in the probability.
Table 5 implies that the probability of incumbents being
defeated fell from at least 1980 to 1988 and then rose dramatically
during 1990, 1992, and 1994. The results using the time trend imply
that the 1992 and 1994 increase in the probability that incumbents
will be defeated offset between 15.7 (specification 1) and 13.8
(specification 2) election cycles worth of decline in that probability.
Given that the data only encompasses 10 election cycles, these two
specifications imply an increase in the probability that incumbents
will be defeated that is outside our sample period. The specifications
3 and 4 using the year dummy variables implied a less dramatic those
still strong result: term limit increased the probability of incumbents
being defeated back to where it had been in 1980.
Given the very short-lived nature of Proposition 73’s campaign
donation limits and that the probability of incumbents being
defeated was between 14 and 37 percent higher in 1992 and 1994
than 1990, it appears very difficult to attribute much if any of the
drop in reelection rates to the campaign donation limits. If anything, the results weakly suggest the reverse occurring: that term
limits lowered the probability, but not by as much as would have occurred without the donation limits. This result is also consistent
with much of the political science and public choice literatures that
view donation limits as making it relatively more difficult for challengers than incumbents to raise money.
The other coefficients have signs that are consistent with our
earlier discussion, but they are not always significant. Incumbents
who did well in previous elections have a lower probability of being
defeated, though this effect increases at a decreasing rate. Incumbent’s tenure significantly reduces the probability that an incumbent
will be defeated, though this declines at a decreasing rate. State
senators and those running in the general election both face higher
probabilities of being defeated. Redistricting and presidential elections raise the probability of an incumbents being defeated, though
only in one specification is one of these coefficients significant.
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C. The Number of Major Party Candidates, Vote Margins, and
Whether Candidates Run Unopposed
Table 6 presents other evidence on the increased legislative
competition that has arisen under term limits, and the results are
consistent with those in the preceding section and our theoretical
discussion. The regressions use the same specifications that we used
earlier except that the dummy for whether candidates are running
unopposed is excluded from the first and fourth regressions since
those regressions are themselves attempting to explain the number of
candidates. Term limits appear to have dramatically reversed weak
time trends indicating that the number of major party candidates in
races were falling, races were become less close, and more races involved just a single candidate. Imposing limits increases the number
of major party candidates by 24 percent of a standard deviation, decreases the vote margin in elections by 10 to 22 percent of a standard
deviation, and decreases the number of races where there is only one
candidate by 89 percent of a standard deviation. As with the earlier
results, all these regressions imply that term limits produce more
electoral competition than existed earlier during the entire sample
period. These four specifications were also rerun with year dummies
and with the squared values of the lagged vote margins for incumbents and tenure, and they resulted in very similar results.
III. CONCLUSION
California’s legislative term limits have dramatically reduced
campaign expenditures, while at the same time that more candidates
are running for office and races are becoming more competitive. By
any measure, term limits have coincided with large changes in the
level of political competition, and these changes have occurred even
before term limits have even forcibly removed one politician from
office. The regressions imply that term limits have reduced real campaign expenditures to less than what was spent in 1976 when
campaign expenditure data was first collected. The changes are so
large that more incumbents are being defeated, races are closer, more
candidates are running, and there are fewer single candidate races
than at any other time in our sample.
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TABLE

1

LIST OF VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable
Name
Margin
Lagged
Margin
Incumbent
ln(Lagged
Margin
Incumbent)
Incumbent
Dummy
Unopposed
Dummy
Incumbent’s
Tenure
Presidential
Year Dummy
Total District
Campaign
Expenditures
Number of
Major Party
Candidates

Description
Mean
Margin of victory in primary
69.63
and general elections
Margin of victory by the
49.01
current incumbent in the last
similar type of election
Margin of victory by the
3.959
current incumbent in the last
similar type of election
Equals one if there is an
0.564
incumbent in the race
Equals one if there is only one
0.561
candidate in the race
Incumbent’s tenure in number
4.6086
of years (Mean for years 1982-94)
Equals one if it is a presidential
0.4986
election year
Total Campaign Expenditures by 94,970.77
type of election in 1982 dollars
The total number of major party
candidates running for office in
either a general or primary election
in a particular district

1.382

Standard
Deviation
36.63
44.29

0.9473

0.4959
0.4964
4.901
0.5001
200,666.70

1.135

Sources
Primary Election Results: California Secretary of State, Statement of Vote and
Supplement Primary Election, June 8, 1976; June 6, 1978; June 5, 1984; and
June 3, 1986. Los Angeles Times, June 8, 1978; June 5, 1980; June 9, 1982;
June 10, 1982; June 9, 1988; June 7, 1990; and June 4, 1992.
General Election Results: California Secretary of State, Statement of Vote and
Supplement General Election November 7, 1978. California Secretary of
State, Statement of Vote General Election November 2, 1976; November 4,
1980; November 2, 1982; November 6, 1984; November 4, 1986;
November 8, 1988; November 6, 1990; and November 3, 1992.
Campaign Expenditures: California Fair Political Practices Commission, Campaign Contribution and Spending Reports, State of California: Sacramento,
Ca., various years.
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TABLE

2

CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES AND TERM LIMITS
(OLS is used to produce these estimates and State Assembly and Senate
district dummies were included in all specifications. All dollars are in real
1982 dollars. Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses.)

Exogenous
Variables
Term Limit
Dummy 1992-94
Dummy 1990
Time Trend
Lagged Margin
Incumbent
Lagged Margin
Incumbent Sq.
Unopposed
Presidential
Year Dummy
Incumbent
Dummy
Incumbent’s
Tenure
Incumbent’s
Tenure Squared
Redistricting
Year Dummy
Per Capita Income
at the State Level
Senate Dummy
General Election
Dummy
Intercept
Number of Obs.=
F-Statistic =
Adj-R2 =

Endogenous Variables
ln (Total District
Total District
Campaign Expenditures)
Campaign Expenditures
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-1.2013
(4.623)
-1.10827
(1.795)
0.15955
(2.762)
-.00213
(1.241)
...

-1.2535
(4.776)
-1.1300
(1.828)
0.1594
(2.759)
-.01728
(2.103)
.00013
(1.905)
-.7767
(7.307)
0.17275
(1.241)
-.2235
(0.938)
-.04686
(1.071)
.00358
(1.428)
-.4500
(1.735)
-.00016
(1.229)
1.1247
(1.585)
0.7552
(5.701)
12.2025
(5.736)
1749
4.31
.2000

-132248.2
(3.859)
-140133.1
(1.714)
15278.16
(1.992)
-337.05
(1.494)
...

-134124.4
(3.889)
-133537.6
(1.638)
14344.51
(1.876)
-4614.63
(4.259)
36.98172
(4.050)
-62670.14
(4.566)
21595.52
(1.204)
-50901.05
(1.624)
-794.818
(0.142)
251.2856
(0.796)
-30948.57
(0.865)
-5.7393
(0.325)
294291
(3.104)
84030.7
(4.829)
78489
(0.279)
1841
4.88
.2178

-.78149
(7.357)
0.1888
(1.357)
-.1641
(0.913)
0.00928
(2.619)
...
-.59429
(2.184)
-.00017
(1.275)
1.16869
(1.647)
0.6634
(5.228)
12.3214
(5.789)
1749
4.32
.1979
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-61908.63
(4.499)
23361.2
(1.299)
-28273.52
(1.195)
2782.98
(1.433)
...
-70517.07
(1.971)
-8.0890
(0.456)
296860
(3.121)
62991.26
(3.768)
120518.2
(0.427)
1841
4.78
.2107

U SING

TABLE 3
CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES AND TERM LIMITS :
YEAR DUMMIES FOR 1978 TO 1990 INSTEAD OF A TIME TREND

(Specifications 1 through 4 use OLS and correspond to their number
counterparts in Table 2. The same variables that were controlled for i n
Table 2 are controlled for here with the exception of year dummy
variable for redistricting years. Some year dummies were dropped because
of collinearity. State Assembly and Senate district dummies included i n
all specifications. All dollars are in real 1982 dollars. Absolute t-statistics
are in parentheses.)

Exogenous
Variables

Endogenous Variables
ln (Total District
Total District
Campaign Expenditures)
Campaign Expenditures
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Term Limit
Dummy 1992-94

-.8012
(5.995)

-.8627
(6.311)

-108033
(6.231)

-115667.8
(6.551)

Year Dummy 1990

0.9098
(4.119)

0.8833
(4.000)

-3552.24
(0.144)

-4779.02
(0.194)

Year Dummy 1988

Dropped due to collinearity

Dropped due to collinearity

Year Dummy 1986

0.5478
(2.326)

0.5423
(2.301)

Dropped due to collinearity

Year Dummy 1984

0.2980
(1.515)

0.3018
(1.537)

21004.82
(0.798)

20662.22
(0.788)

Year Dummy 1982

0.36247
(1.701)

0.3510
(1.643)

-36121.8
(1.418)

-37607.6
(1.482)

Year Dummy 1980

Dropped due to collinearity

Dropped due to collinearity

Year Dummy 1978

Dropped due to collinearity

-61707.82
(1.980)

-56804.22
(1.701)

Intercept

7.10805
(7.848)

8.459
(9.966)

-302497.7
(2.323)

-321696.4
(1.827)

Number of Obs.=
F-Statistic =
Adj-R2 =

1749
4.29
.1977

1749
4.28
.1997

1841
4.75
.2106

1841
4.85
.2177
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TABLE 4
CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES AND TERM LIMITS : RERUNNING THE
SPECIFICATIONS IN TABLE 2 BY INCLUDING A TERM FOR EACH
INCUMBENT’S DEPRECIATED BRAND NAME CAPITAL USING A 20
PERCENT DEPRECIATION RATE

(Specifications 1 through 4 use OLS and correspond to their number
counterparts in Table 2. While the results for the other variables are not
reported, the same variables that were controlled for in Table 2 are
controlled for here. Again, State Assembly and Senate district dummies
included in all specifications. All dollars are in real 1982 dollars.
Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses.)

Exogenous
Variables

Endogenous Variables
ln (Total District
Total District
Campaign Expenditures)
Campaign Expenditures
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Term Limit
Dummy 1992-94

-1.20236
(4.168)

-1.2742
(4.367)

-133196.1
(3.580)

-137049.5
(3.655)

Dummy 1990

-1.1799
(1.640)

-1.0743
(1.491)

-158906.4
(1.705)

-132964.7
(1.428)

Time Trend

0.1585
(2.394)

0.1494
(2.254)

15135.67
(1.761)

12805.11
(1.492)

Incumbent’s
Depreciated Past
Campaign Exp.

3.38e-7
(1.672)

3.44e-7
(1.702)

.1202
(4.782)

0.1215
(4.856)

Number of Obs.=
F-Statistic =
Adj-R2 =

1415
3.66
.1980

1415
3.69
.2018

1498
4.84
.2514

1498
4.92
.2584
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TABLE

5

TERM LIMITS AND THE PROBABILITY THAT
AN INCUMBENT WILL BE DEFEATED
(Logit regressions were used to explain a dummy variable that equaled
one when an incumbent was defeated. The sample is restricted to only
those observations where an incumbent was running for reelection i n
either the primary or general elections. Though they are not reported,
the same variables that were controlled for in Table 2 are controlled for
here. Again, State Assembly and Senate district dummies included i n
all specifications. All dollars are in real 1982 dollars. Absolute zstatistics are in parentheses.)
Exogenous
Variables

Endogenous Variable: Whether Incumbent was Defeated
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

2.0601
(2.086)
1.7657
(2.257)
-.14897
(1.721)
...

1.0215
(2.350)
0.8999
(1.477)
...

0.8289
(1.873)
0.71157
(1.040)
...

Year Dummy 1988

2.8097
(3.007)
2.0512
(2.878)
-.1793
(2.161)
...

Year Dummy 1986

...

...

Year Dummy 1984

...

...

Year Dummy 1982
collinearity
Year Dummy 1980

...

...

...

...

Year Dummy 1978
collinearity
Lagged Margin
Incumbent
Lagged Margin
Incumbent Sq.
Presidential
Year Dummy
Redistricting
Year Dummy
Incumbent’s

...

...

-.0114
(2.178)
...

-.0554
(2.224)
0.0004
(1.853)
0.90977
(2.063)
0.40096
(0.922)
-.6543

Term Limit
Dummy 1992-94
Dummy 1990
Time Trend

0.6748
(1.612)
0.2741
(0.658)
-.1107
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-1.4734
-1.0414
(1.612)
(1.221)
-.93819
-.93179
(1.078)
(1.017)
-.8193
-1.2763
(1.048)
(1.520)
Dropped due to
0.9928
0.65817
(1.648)
(1.041)
Dropped due to
-.01160
(2.190)
...
0.51296
(1.051)
0.6472
(1.478)
-.11460

-.05627
(2.237)
0.0004
(1.849)
0.9326
(1.774)
0.6313
(1.348)
-.6835

Tenure
Incumbent’s
Tenure Squared
Senate Dummy

(2.331)
...

(2.388)
...

18.3647
(10.264)

(4.945)
0.0334
(4.386)
16.473
(6.407)

18.376
(11.436)

(4.987)
0.034999
(4.406)
17.453
(6.663)

General Election
Dummy
Intercept

0.4377
(1.128)
-18.1459
(6.997)

1.1723
(2.541)
-16.0628
(6.464)

0.4820
(1.223)
-20.35
(9.695)

1.2269
(2.616)
-18.769
(8.099)

Number of Obs.=
Log Likelihood =
Chi-Squared=
Pseudo R2 =

846
-162.98
107.23
.2475

846
-146.65
139.89
.3229

846
-160.37
112.44
.2596

846
-143.42
146.33
.3378
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TABLE

6

TERM LIMITS , THE NUMBER OF MAJOR PARTY CANDIDATES, VOTE
M ARGINS , AND WHETHER CANDIDATES RUN UNOPPOSED
(OLS is used for the first three specifications and a logit specification is used for the
fourth. State Assembly and Senate district dummies are included in all specifications.
All dollars are in real 1982 dollars. Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses.)

Endogenous Variables
Exogenous
Variables

No. of
Major Party
Candidates
(1)

Term Limit
0.2666
Dummy 1992-94 (2.684)
Dummy 1990
0.0715
(0.861)
Time Trend
-.0160
(1.836)
Redistricting
0.0456
Year Dummy
(0.889)
Lagged Margin -.00212
Incumbent
(2.623)
Unopposed
...
Presidential
Year Dummy
Incumbent
Dummy
Incumbent’s
Tenure
Senate Dummy

0.0205
(0.447)
-.4880
(5.983)
0.0007
(0.114)
-.3453
(0.998)
General Election 0.33566
Dummy
(6.526)
Intercept
1.94659
(8.561)
Number of Obs.= 2338
F-Statistic or Chi
Square =
3.34
Adj-R2 or Pseudo
R 2=
.1138

Absolute Vote
Margin
Between Top 2
Candidates

ln (Absolute
Vote Margin
Between Top
2 Candidates)

Dummy Variable
Equaling in
Only 1 Candidate
in Race

(2)

(3)

(4)

-4.3199
(3.070)
-4.1463
(3.533)
0.0867
(0.701)
-1.5382
(2.115)
0.02798
(2.452)
68.3369
(95.223)
-.07829
(0.120)
3.1412
(2.708)
0.07575
(0.823)
-6.4917
(1.329)
1.5615
(1.811)
27.4718
(8.459)

-.2084
(3.102)
-.1686
(3.010)
0.0081
(1.670)
-.0357
(-1.028)
0.0004
(0.737)
1.4871
(43.403)
-.00578
(0.186)
0.2229
(4.026)
0.0025
(0.577)
-.47717
(2.047)
0.1226
(2.979)
2.8897
(18.635)

-.4406
(1.584)
0.03116
(0.128)
0.0030
(1.321)
-.1073
(0.739)
-.0030
(1.228)
...
-.11936
(0.892)
1.5963
(6.015)
0.0147
(0.776)
0.15599
(0.142)
-4.4633
(19.960)
1.2373
(1.614)

2325

2325

2338

126.73

27.36

1215.76

.8747

.5941

.3757
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